Heng Cai Chen v. Attorney Gen USA by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-17-2013 
Heng Cai Chen v. Attorney Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Heng Cai Chen v. Attorney Gen USA" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 80. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/80 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2199 
___________ 
 
HENG CAI CHEN, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                    Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-799-621) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 9, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 17, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Heng Cai Chen (“Chen”), a citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) denial of his motion to reopen.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                                             I. 
 In 2008, Chen appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for removal 
proceedings and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture based upon his practice of Catholicism and his refusal to 
marry the daughter of his town’s mayor.  The IJ rendered an adverse credibility finding 
and ordered Chen removed to China.  The BIA dismissed Chen’s appeal in 2009, and we 
denied his subsequent petition for review in Chen v. Att’y Gen., 386 F. App’x 205 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 In 2010, Chen filed a motion to reopen with the BIA.  He stated that he had been 
baptized as a Christian in 2010, and that the Chinese government had increased its 
persecution of unregistered Christian groups between 2008 and 2010.  In denying the 
motion, the BIA found that Chen’s evidence did not establish a change in country 
conditions and that he had not addressed the IJ’s prior adverse credibility finding.  Chen 
did not petition us for review of the Board’s decision. 
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 In October 2012, Chen filed a second motion to reopen with the BIA.  In this 
motion, he asserted that the Chinese government had increased its persecution of 
unregistered Christian groups by beginning a campaign to eradicate “house churches.”  
His motion also alleged that such persecution would increase because of a “fundamental 
upheaval” occurring in China’s “general political structure.”  In denying the motion, the 
BIA determined that Chen’s evidence neither established a change in country conditions 
nor demonstrated that he would suffer persecution upon his return to China.  
Accordingly, the Board determined that Chen lacked a basis for filing his second motion 
to reopen after the 90-day deadline had passed.  Through counsel, Chen filed this petition 
for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review denials of motions to 
reopen under a deferential abuse of discretion standard and will not disturb the decision 
“unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”1  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  Generally, an alien may file only one 
motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on 
which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The 
                                              
1
 Because we find that the BIA’s decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, 
we do not reach the BIA’s alternative conclusion that Chen did not establish a prima facie 
case for asylum relief.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (stating that the Board may deny a motion 
to reopen in asylum cases where it determines that “the movant would not be entitled to 
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time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that are “based upon 
changed country conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  Pllumi v. Att’y 
Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Chen does not dispute that his motion to reopen, his second, was filed more than 
90 days after the BIA’s final decision.  Rather, he first asserts that the BIA erred in 
denying the motion by relying on the prior adverse credibility determination.  That 
determination was mentioned only when the Board provided an overview of Chen’s past 
removal proceedings and stated that the IJ “found that he was not credible.”  
Accordingly, we cannot agree with Chen that the BIA relied on the adverse credibility 
finding as a reason to deny his motion to reopen. 
 Chen asserts that the Board also abused its discretion by “cherry-picking” the 
record to find that he failed to establish changed country conditions.  We have previously 
stated that the BIA is required to consider a party’s evidence of changed country 
conditions, and that it “should provide us with more than cursory, summary or conclusory 
statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for declining to afford relief to a 
petitioner.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. 
BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  However, it need not “expressly parse or refute 
on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.”  
                                                                                                                                                  
the discretionary grant of relief”)). 
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Wang, 437 F.3d at 275 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the BIA 
reviewed, among the evidence that Chen submitted, his baptism certificate, a letter from 
Chen’s church in the United States, Chen’s affidavit, China Aid media reports from 2012, 
and the 2011 Fujian Province Comprehensive Social Order Administration Regulations.  
It then discussed the China Aid media reports to support its finding that Chen’s evidence 
was inadequate to demonstrate the existence of changed country conditions. 
 To the extent Chen argues that the Board erred by failing to find the existence of 
changed country conditions, we conclude that the BIA’s determination was reasonable.  
In its order denying Chen’s first motion to reopen, the Board took judicial notice of the 
2010 International Religious Freedom Report, which establishes that the practice of 
Christianity in China is restricted to churches registered with the government, and that 
leaders and members of unregistered churches have continued to face detention for 
religious activities.  This report also notes that “[s]ince 1999, the Secretary of State has 
designated [China] a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ … under the International 
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”  
See also Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (country reports 
described as the “most appropriate” and “perhaps best resource” on country conditions) 
(citation omitted).  Furthermore, the media reports Chen submitted detailing various raids 
on underground churches can be viewed as illustrations of the continuous persecution of 
Christians in China, not as demonstrating a change in country conditions.  Based upon the 
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evidence, the BIA plausibly concluded that restrictions upon religious freedom have 
persisted in China since before Chen’s 2008 hearing.  See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 161 (BIA 
did not err in denying reopening where “the conditions described have persisted”). 
III. 
 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Board’s decision to deny Chen’s 
motion to reopen was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Accordingly, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
 
